' admittedly a rehabilitation of the mechanistic theory in the light of those biological developments which have brought into being the behaviouristic standpoint in psychology '. And by ' publicist standpoint' he means the rejection, the refusal to take into account in any scientific scheme of things, in any scientific description or interpretation of Nature, the facts of individual experience, of what is unfortunately called ' consciousness '. He does not, like the extreme American behaviourists, deny the occurrence of conscious activities, of experience, of awareness; or, like less extreme behaviourists, attempt to explain the facts away ; nor does he, like many others, dismiss them as 'epiphenomena' and as therefore of no significance; but he asserts that they are negligible because they are private and because science can take account only of public facts, facts which can be verified by anyone who will take the appropriate steps of observation and experiment. To this the proper answer is that, if science is thus inevitably debarred from admitting as evidence the private facts of individual experience, then so much the worse for science. For all the data of observation, whether experimental or other, have first to be facts of individual experience before they can attain the status of verified public facts. Even the pointer-readings on scale-measures, such as thermometers and balances and pressure-gauges and meter-scales, are phenomena, appearances to sense-perceiving individuals, and are infected to some degree with our

individual peculiarities, or 'personal equations'. And though some physicists seem to think that such pointer-readings are all that science needs and can properly use as data, that is a misunderstanding. The most accurate pointer-readings are of no use to any observer or thinker unless